Participate in the Governance of DIA

The proposal was added to the Snapshot vote and is labeled under “Community Proposal #1”. [The Snapshot vote](https://snapshot.box/#/s:diadao.eth/proposal/0x04fb7d4868749484be59b734f2e937b59bf187019f22eb5cc168b00b1ccd4d17) is now live.

The proposal was added to the Snapshot vote and is labeled under “Community Proposal #2”. [The Snapshot vote](https://snapshot.box/#/s:diadao.eth/proposal/0x04fb7d4868749484be59b734f2e937b59bf187019f22eb5cc168b00b1ccd4d17) is now live.

Thank you for the detailed points, Alex and Anze. I will address them clearly so the community understands why this proposal went up. Firstly i support the team’s proposal fully. This airdrop framework only applies if the community decides to vote for an airdrop. In that situation, I want the right users rewarded, not sybil farms. 1. Eligibility are now defined and measurable. These thresholds remove inactive users, remove test accounts, and remove sybil setups. This ensures that only real users with real network involvement enter the list. 2. The number of eligible users will be clear On chain queries will produce the exact counts. Nothing stays unknown. Everything is verifiable. The community gets a clean dataset before any vote proceeds. 3. **A small user base does not mean the proposal is unfair Lasernet is under 9 months old. Early users engaged when activity was low and risk was higher. They provided traction at a stage when adoption was uncertain. APY is yield for staking. Early participation was contribution. These are different and should be treated as different.** **Rewarding early contributors is not double paying. It acknowledges users who helped the network bootstrap.** 4. Treasury impact is controlled The allocation is fixed at *91,500 DIA which is 10%* of the requested amount. It is targeted. It does not interfere with long term plans. It does not dilute broader strategic spending. It applies only if the community votes for an airdrop. The proposal does not force an airdrop. It only sets rules so that if the community wants it, the distribution is clean and fair. 5. There was no rush and no urgency The goal was clarity. If there is an airdrop vote, the distribution should not go to sybil farms and random wallets. It should go to users with real economic involvement. The proposal gives structure. Without structure, the process is broken. This keeps the ecosystem aligned with fairness and verifiable contribution. **To the community members who want an airdrop, this framework protects you from a sybil dominated outcome. To the members who support the team proposal, this framework does not interfere with it.**

Hello everyone, While I appreciate the intention behind rewarding early Lasernet users, I must highlight several critical concerns that make it impossible for me and for the community I represent to support this airdrop at this time. 1. **We do not know how many users are actually eligible?** The proposal relies on eligibility criteria that have **never been quantified**: * We do not know the number of wallets with ≥200 DIA bridged * We do not know the number of wallets with ≥200 DIA staked * We do not know how many wallets are non-team, non-sybil, and meet the thresholds * Or how many wallets staked for a short period, then withdrew immediately? Some repeatedly bridged small amounts simply to trigger contract interactions, others only engaged once, months ago, with no continuity Because of this, the total number of eligible participants could be **extremely small**, based on existing Lasernet activity. This creates a major structural problem: ➡️ **A tiny group would receive a disproportionately large payout from the treasury** ➡️ **These users have already earned APY from staking**, meaning they are double-rewarded ➡️ **The majority of the community receives nothing**, including long-term voters and supporters This is neither equitable nor aligned with DIA’s long-term strategic direction. --- 2. **The proposal does not justify the 91,500 DIA cost** Based on the real level of Lasernet activity and onchain engagement, this airdrop **does not merit** a 91,500 DIA allocation. A reward of this size should reflect: * significant contributions, * broad community participation, * multi-year engagement, and * measurable ecosystem expansion. The described interactions (bridge + staking) do **not** deliver value proportional to such a large treasury expenditure. ➡️ **The cost far exceeds the impact.** --- --- **Additional note on the proposal:** It seems there is a sense of urgency to push for an airdrop, perhaps more for the sake of having one than for carefully designing a fair, sustainable distribution. While every community member is free to vote as they wish, we must recognize that **if the outcome will show only a very small number of eligible participants**, the airdrop would contradict the core values of DIA and DAO governance. In such a case, **the proposal would naturally be cancelled** to preserve fairness, proportionality, and alignment with long-term community interests. Both DIA Lumina and Lasernet have been live for **less than 9 months**. Their short operational history means that **on-chain activity so far cannot be considered a reliable measure of sustained contribution or long-term alignment with the DIA ecosystem**. Distributing an airdrop at this stage risks rewarding opportunistic or short-term behavior rather than genuine engagement that supports network growth. This underscores the broader point: **DAO treasury allocations must be data-driven, transparent, and tied to measurable, sustained contributions , not rushed simply to execute an airdrop** Highlighting the importance of **data-driven decision making** in DAOs: eligibility, contribution, and community alignment should always guide token distribution, not merely the desire to execute an airdrop. Regards, Alex