Participate in the Governance of DIA

DIA tokenholders can take part in the decision-making of the DIA Platform and Association

Learn: How to Govern
From ideation to implementation, learn the governance process, requirements and more.
Discuss: DIA Forum
A space to propose and discuss ideas to improve the DIA platform, product and processes.
Vote: DIA Snapshot
Where proposals are voted on-chain by DIA tokenholders before implementation.

The Governance Modules

DIA’s governance and validation happen on many levels via the following DIA DAO modules. Learn more and get started.

DIPs - DIA Improvement Proposals
DIPs are strictly product-related proposals, subjects of discussion can range from the implementation of new data computation methodologies or certain tech stacks.
See DIPs
GDPs - General DIA Proposals
GDPs are general DAO proposals, subject of discussion are not product or platform specific proposals but rather operational matters, community, or treasury, among others.
See GDPs
CARs - Community Approval Requests
A CAR is an approval mechanism for DIA’s product categories. They are designed in order to facilitate a lean process for the DIA DAO to approve or reject processes, content and infrastructure.
See CARs
CDRs - Custom Delivery Requests
A CDR is a mechanism for dApps to publicly request custom data and oracle deliveries to DIA. CDRs will provide a lean process for protocols to request tailor-made data feeds.
See CDRs

Forum activity

Participate in the latest community discussion of the DIA Forum

GDP #018: DIA DAO Annual Treasury Release for 2026
**Treasury Vote Concluded – Core Team Proposal Approved** The 2026 DIA DAO Treasury Vote has concluded. The core team proposal was approved with 98.85% community support. Thank you to everyone who participated in this governance process, and special thanks to Ahmed and Hypolithe for submitting community proposals and Alex for contributing to the discussion. We appreciate the thoughtful engagement from all sides. Implementation of the approved treasury allocation will begin in 2026 as outlined in the proposal. **View the final results:** [https://snapshot.box/#/s:diadao.eth/proposal/0x04fb7d4868749484be59b734f2e937b59bf187019f22eb5cc168b00b1ccd4d17](https://snapshot.box/#/s:diadao.eth/proposal/0x04fb7d4868749484be59b734f2e937b59bf187019f22eb5cc168b00b1ccd4d17) Best regards, Anze, Community & DAO Lead
Community Proposal for the Annual Treasury Tranche Release of DIA DAO (2025)
The proposal was added to the Snapshot vote and is labeled under “Community Proposal #1”. [The Snapshot vote](https://snapshot.box/#/s:diadao.eth/proposal/0x04fb7d4868749484be59b734f2e937b59bf187019f22eb5cc168b00b1ccd4d17) is now live.
Community Proposal for the Annual Treasury Tranche Release of DIA DAO (2026) II
The proposal was added to the Snapshot vote and is labeled under “Community Proposal #2”. [The Snapshot vote](https://snapshot.box/#/s:diadao.eth/proposal/0x04fb7d4868749484be59b734f2e937b59bf187019f22eb5cc168b00b1ccd4d17) is now live.
Community Proposal for the Annual Treasury Tranche Release of DIA DAO (2026) II
Thank you for the detailed points, Alex and Anze. I will address them clearly so the community understands why this proposal went up. Firstly i support the team’s proposal fully. This airdrop framework only applies if the community decides to vote for an airdrop. In that situation, I want the right users rewarded, not sybil farms. 1. Eligibility are now defined and measurable. These thresholds remove inactive users, remove test accounts, and remove sybil setups. This ensures that only real users with real network involvement enter the list. 2. The number of eligible users will be clear On chain queries will produce the exact counts. Nothing stays unknown. Everything is verifiable. The community gets a clean dataset before any vote proceeds. 3. **A small user base does not mean the proposal is unfair Lasernet is under 9 months old. Early users engaged when activity was low and risk was higher. They provided traction at a stage when adoption was uncertain. APY is yield for staking. Early participation was contribution. These are different and should be treated as different.** **Rewarding early contributors is not double paying. It acknowledges users who helped the network bootstrap.** 4. Treasury impact is controlled The allocation is fixed at *91,500 DIA which is 10%* of the requested amount. It is targeted. It does not interfere with long term plans. It does not dilute broader strategic spending. It applies only if the community votes for an airdrop. The proposal does not force an airdrop. It only sets rules so that if the community wants it, the distribution is clean and fair. 5. There was no rush and no urgency The goal was clarity. If there is an airdrop vote, the distribution should not go to sybil farms and random wallets. It should go to users with real economic involvement. The proposal gives structure. Without structure, the process is broken. This keeps the ecosystem aligned with fairness and verifiable contribution. **To the community members who want an airdrop, this framework protects you from a sybil dominated outcome. To the members who support the team proposal, this framework does not interfere with it.**
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Questions?

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