Market cap
DIA price
Total supply
Holders
549.1M USD0
123,300holders
What the top-10 is
Shares of the same supply as Top-10, from public address labels covering 97.7% of the top-10 balance. Exchange custody is one address holding for many end holders. Unattributed means unlabelled, not self-custodied.
Measured on Ethereum. Shares are of the Ethereum supply, not the multi-chain total.
-$258.9Ksince Fri, Aug 28 UTC
Change in the supply DIA reads across this coin’s chains, between two daily snapshots. Not mints minus redeems: DIA does not publish issuance flow.
Market data · CoinGecko
Market data · CoinGecko
Circulating supply · DeFiLlama
Aggregator figure, not a contract read. DIA’s own onchain supply is the separate series below.
Percentage change in USD0's circulating supply as reported by DeFiLlama, measured against that source's own past. It is not a change in the onchain supply above, which DIA reads from the contracts directly and which is a different measurement of the same coin. A dash means the map has no reading close enough to the start of the window, a stretch inside it where supply was not reported at all, or a starting figure too small for a percentage to describe. Hover a dash for which.
$4K
deployed across 1 market on 1 protocol
Lower bound: USD0's balance inside lending markets DIA reads on-chain directly. Excludes DEX liquidity, CDP collateral, and any market on a chain or protocol DIA does not yet track.
DIA price
$0.9989
Peg deviation
—
Peg currency
USD
Launched
Primary use
—
Last snapshot
Fri, Sep 4 UTC
USD0 holds no dollars. It holds tokens issued by other firms against US Treasury exposure. Usual's documentation describes it as "a permissionless, fully collateralized stablecoin backed by tokenized US Treasury Bills and repurchase agreements (repos)". Usual issues it as a standard ERC-20 pegged to the US dollar.
How it is minted
Minting runs on two tracks. Permissioned participants deposit eligible tokenized collateral into the DaoCollateral contract and receive USD0 at par. Everyone else mints through the SwapperEngine contract with USDC, matched against a Collateral Provider who posts the underlying asset, at a launch-phase minimum order size of 100,000 USD0.
DIA's registry reads about 551.4 million USD0 on Ethereum.
Sources: Usual Docs, USD0 stablecoin, Usual Docs, USD0 mint and redeem flow and architecture
What sits behind the token
Usual's collateral policy admits four assets: USYC from Hashnote, M from M0 Foundation, USTBL, and USDC for indirect minting. Each must be fully collateralized with no leverage, carry a portfolio duration below 0.33 years, and be redeemable within a maximum of five business days.
The largest named collateral is not a Treasury bill portfolio. USYC is "the on-chain representation of the Hashnote International Short Duration Yield Fund Ltd.", and that fund "invests primarily in reverse repo and U.S. Government backed securities". Usual's counterparty page names BNY Mellon as custodian on the USYC leg, DTCC as clearing, and Marex as prime broker.
What the disclosure leaves out
Usual publishes no periodic reserve attestation for USD0. The FAQ states the position directly: "Reserve composition is visible on-chain in real time, without reliance on third-party attestations." On-chain balances are the proof of reserves layer, and they stop at the token boundary. A balance shows how much USYC the protocol holds, not what the Hashnote fund holds.
The counterparty page lists tokenizers and custodians with no allocation percentages. It names no audit firm for any tokenizer.
Sources: Usual Docs, RWA collateral eligibility, Usual Tech Docs, USYC by Hashnote, Usual Docs, counterparty risk, Usual Docs, FAQ
The protocol runs an insurance fund against undercollateralization, capped between 0.33% and 5.33% of circulating USD0 depending on whether the stress test covers interest-rate shocks alone or counterparty failure as well. It is funded from a share of collateral yield. Its counter bank run mechanism burns USD0 held by the fund, raising the redemption value of the remainder.
Sources: Usual Docs, insurance fund, Usual Tech Docs, bUSD0 (formerly USD0++)
Usual's documentation makes no licence claim for USD0. The perimeter it describes sits one layer down, on the firms that issue the collateral. The risk policy accepts custodians and banks with strong credit ratings, and requires assets "ring-fenced in a bankruptcy remote vehicle (BRV) in the event of the tokenizer's insolvency".
For EUR0, the euro token built on the same architecture, Usual names Spiko as an approved and supervised collateral provider.
Sources: Usual Docs, counterparty risk, Usual Docs, EUR0 stablecoin
Where the claim sits
A holder's ultimate claim is on tokenized fund shares issued by Hashnote, M0 Foundation and the other tokenizers, not on Usual. Usual defines credit risk as loss from "a default, delayed payment, or deterioration in the credit quality of securities held as collateral". Its policy requires ring-fencing in a bankruptcy remote vehicle. Whether that holds is decided by each vehicle's legal documents, which Usual does not publish.
Redemption is not instant for everyone
Direct redemption at DaoCollateral returns the underlying tokenized asset. The holder then redeems that asset with the RWA partner, and Usual's eligibility rule allows up to five business days for that leg. The permissionless mint path carries a launch-phase minimum order size of 100,000 USD0.
Sources: Usual Docs, credit risk, Usual Docs, counterparty risk, Usual Docs, RWA collateral eligibility
The Global Stablecoin Map tracks USD0 on Ethereum, at contract 0x73A15FeD60Bf67631dC6cd7Bc5B6e8da8190aCF5. Supply and price on this page are DIA first-party registry reads: about 551.4 million USD0 on the Ethereum contract. RWA.xyz shows about 126,000 holders. The registry also lists Arbitrum.
Usual's documentation says USD0 is deployed on Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base and BNB Chain. The supply figure above covers the Ethereum contract only, so float on Base and BNB Chain sits outside it.
The map reads peg, chain, contract and float. It does not read a per-asset reserve breakdown, because the collateral is held as tokenized fund shares issued by third parties. Other RWA-backed tokens sit alongside USD0 in the stablecoin explorer.
Sources: Usual Docs, USD0 stablecoin (chain deployments), RWA.xyz, USD0 asset page
USD0 is backed by tokenized real-world assets rather than bank deposits. Usual's collateral policy admits USYC from Hashnote, M from M0 Foundation, USTBL, and USDC for indirect minting. Each asset must be fully collateralized with no leverage, carry a portfolio duration below 0.33 years, and be redeemable within a maximum of five business days.
No. Usual's FAQ states that reserve composition is visible on-chain in real time, without reliance on third-party attestations. Verification runs through the tokenized fund shares held in the protocol's contracts, which show how much collateral the protocol holds but not what the underlying funds hold.
No. On 10 January 2025 Usual set a floor price of 0.87 USD0 for USD0++, the bond token minted by locking USD0, and USD0++ fell to approximately $0.92 on decentralized exchanges. The Block reported USD0 itself still pegged to $1 at that time.
Direct redemption at the DaoCollateral contract returns the underlying tokenized asset, which the holder then redeems with the RWA partner. Usual's eligibility rule allows up to five business days for that second leg.
The map holds an Ethereum contract for USD0 and also lists Arbitrum. Usual's documentation says USD0 is deployed on Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base and BNB Chain, so the supply figure shown covers the Ethereum contract only.
0x35f1c5cb…8a3a6850Explorer ↗0x73A15FeD…8190aCF5Explorer ↗Supply on this page is read from these contracts. Addresses are verified by DIA against the issuer’s own published documentation.
0x35f1c5cb…8a3a6850blacklist(address), unBlacklist(address) +1paused()mint(address,uint256)eip1967-transparent0x73a15fed…8190acf5blacklist(address), unBlacklist(address) +1paused()mint(address,uint256)eip1967-transparentRead from the deployed contract. “Not determined” means the contract’s full function set could not be enumerated, not that the capability is absent: a bytecode scan can confirm that a function exists and can never prove that one does not.