tGBP

Overview

tGBP is a pound sterling stablecoin issued by BCP Technologies Ltd, a company registered in England and Wales under number 11121448, incorporated in December 2017 under the previous name Cashin Technologies Ltd, with a registered office in London. That is the name on the Companies House record rather than a brand, and the live product surface is tokenisedgbp.com.

The token is deployed as a LayerZero omnichain fungible token, which puts the same contract address on each of its EVM chains and a separate mint on Solana at a different decimal convention.

What separates this page from most others on the map is the shape of the disclosure rather than its absence. The issuer describes its reserves, states that they are audited every month by an independent auditor, and lists three recent attestation entries by month. None of those entries resolves to a document a reader can open. DIA rates the reserve disclosure Tier C, described rather than reported, and the reasoning is set out below.

Sources: Tokenised GBP, Companies House, BCP TECHNOLOGIES LTD, company number 11121448, Tokenised GBP transparency page (rendered with JavaScript executed)

Backing and reserves

The transparency page describes reserves as cash and cash equivalents held with banking partners in the United Kingdom. It carries a section headed Proof of Reserve Attestations listing entries for June 2026, May 2026 and April 2026, and the sentence "tGBP reserves are audited monthly by an independent auditor".

No attestation is retrievable. Rendered on 30 July 2026 with JavaScript executed, the transparency page exposes zero links, internal or external, and every path on the site including the attestations route returns the same page shell. The three entries are labels rather than documents, so the monthly cadence is asserted rather than evidenced, and no accountant is named anywhere in retrievable text. The homepage does display an accounting firm's logo above the words "Audited Reserves by". DIA does not record an attestor from a logo. That error has already been made once on this map, on a coin whose attestor turned out to be readable only after the report was rendered as an image, and here there is no document to check a logo against at all. No custodian institution is named either, only the class of institution.

What DIA reads regardless is supply, taken from contract state on the chains it indexes, with decimals read per contract because they are not uniform across this token's deployments. That is a first-party measurement and it holds whatever the issuer publishes. It does not verify a bank balance, and no onchain read substitutes for an attestation that is being asserted here rather than shown.

Tier C on the ladder's terms: composition described in issuer documentation, no report published. Checked 2026-07-30. If BCP publishes the reports it says exist, the tier moves up quickly and this block is rewritten.

Sources: Tokenised GBP transparency page (rendered with JavaScript executed), Tokenised GBP

Regulation

The site's own meta description describes tGBP as issued by an FCA-registered firm. DIA has not confirmed that entry and reports it here as the issuer's claim rather than as a verified permission. The Financial Conduct Authority's register search runs client side and returned a broken result count rather than a record when queried on 30 July 2026.

The distinction the phrase compresses matters more than the missing lookup. Registration under the Money Laundering Regulations is an anti-money laundering registration for a firm carrying on cryptoasset activity. Authorisation to issue electronic money is a different permission under a different regime, and a firm can hold the first without holding the second. "FCA-registered" does not say which one, and a reader who takes it as approval of the token's reserve model has read more into it than the words carry.

DIA's disclosure tier does not move on this either way. The ladder measures what an issuer publishes about its reserves and what an independent party attests about them. A permission is a fact about what a firm is allowed to do, not evidence about what it holds, and the two are reported separately on every page of this map.

Sources: Tokenised GBP, FCA Financial Services Register search

Risks

The issuer's own surfaces disagree with each other by roughly 23x. The homepage carries a static statistics block giving circulation in the low millions of pounds across six active chains. The transparency page on the same site publishes a per-chain distribution more than an order of magnitude larger, spread across more chains than the homepage counts. An issuer understating itself is unusual and it is still a disclosure failure. A reader taking the headline figure leaves with a number wrong by more than an order of magnitude, and no date on the static block signals which of the two is current.

The transparency table also omits two of the chains the issuer advertises. Both appear as logos in the homepage contract row and both carry live supply, and neither appears in the per-chain table. A chain a token advertises and does not report is a silent understatement.

The float is wholesale rather than retail. On Ethereum, Blockscout reported 213 holders and 4,254 lifetime transfers over the token's life when DIA read it on 2026-07-30. The five largest addresses hold 84.8 percent between them: an unlabelled externally owned account at 25.45 percent, a vault contract at 18.55 percent, and three further externally owned accounts between 12 and 16 percent. That is not a premint parked in a treasury, since the vault is real and the token carries exchange listings, but a lifetime transfer count in the low thousands is orders of magnitude below what a retail float generates at this size. Redemption pressure on tGBP is a function of a handful of decisions rather than of a market.

The attestation gap is the load-bearing risk. The reserve is described, the audit is asserted monthly, and nothing published lets a reader check either. Concentration and an unnamed custodian both become harder to assess in the absence of the report that would address them.

Sources: Tokenised GBP transparency page (rendered with JavaScript executed), Tokenised GBP, Blockscout, tGBP on Ethereum

What this map tracks

Per-chain reads add rather than double count on this token. An omnichain fungible token can mean either a burn and mint mesh, where each chain's supply is its own, or a lock and mint bridge, where one chain's balance is collateral for another's and a naive sum double counts. DIA read the top holders of the Ethereum leg from Blockscout on 2026-07-30, looking for an escrow or lock contract, and found none among them, which is consistent with burn and mint. That read covered the five largest holders, so the claim is scoped there rather than to the whole holder set, and it was a one off check rather than anything this map computes on a schedule.

Decimals are not uniform on this token, and that is load-bearing. The EVM deployments carry eighteen decimals and the Solana mint carries nine. Anything summing raw contract values without reading decimals per contract is wrong by nine orders of magnitude on that leg alone. This is the third coin on this map where per-contract decimals decide whether a total is a number or a typo, which makes it a pattern rather than one issuer's quirk.

On this coin the aggregator and the first-party read come close, and the arithmetic is worth setting out rather than summarising, because they do not come close on every coin here. CoinGecko reported 25,591,639 tGBP across eight platforms on 2026-07-30. DIA holds a contract address for two of this token's deployments, Ethereum and Base, and read both on that date, carrying 25,126,018.86 tGBP between them. The profile declares seven chains, so the other five are marked unread, and the reason recorded against them is that no contract address is on file rather than that an endpoint failed. Two legs therefore account for 98.2 percent of the aggregator's figure for the whole token, which bounds the unread remainder and any error the aggregator carries, taken together, at under two percent. That is a far narrower read than the closeness of the total suggests, and it is the concentration of this token on two chains rather than the breadth of DIA's coverage that produces it. The same comparison does not hold on the euro and Singapore dollar coins here: on the Singapore dollar coin the aggregator sits about a third below the issuer's most recent attested figure, and there the unread legs are the reason. Aggregator reliability is a per coin property and cannot be inferred from one good case. The value of an independent read is not that the aggregator is always wrong. It is that without one, nobody can tell which case they are looking at.

One coverage note runs the other way. The issuer's transparency data exists, and it exists on a surface that cannot be indexed or linked. The site is a single-page application serving the same shell on every path, with no robots.txt and no sitemap, so its own per-chain breakdown is invisible to search and a reader cannot link anyone to it. A number published where nobody can find it is closer to unpublished than the issuer probably intends.

Sources: Tokenised GBP transparency page (rendered with JavaScript executed), Tokenised GBP, Blockscout, tGBP on Ethereum, CoinGecko, Tokenised GBP

Common questions