Supply
<0.1% of USD stablecoin supply · 43rd of 70 USD stablecoins with supply
Peg today
below $1 · 52 USD stablecoins with $1M+ supply, priced today: median 13 bps from $1
Chains
51st of 70 USD stablecoins read on chain · median 2
Holders on Ethereum
34th of 43 USD stablecoins scanned on Ethereum
Best yield
ranked by lower of 30d and spot APY × deposits · Re · 6.88% base, 0% rewards
reUSD is a USD stablecoin minted by the Resupply protocol's smart contracts, with no central issuer.
Resupply mints reUSD against interest-bearing lending positions. A user supplies crvUSD to Curve Lend or frxUSD to Fraxlend, deposits the resulting ERC-4626 supply receipt into a Resupply collateralized debt position, and borrows reUSD against it. The collateral keeps earning its lending yield while the loan is open.
The minimum mint is 1000 reUSD and the minting fee is currently zero.
reUSD tracks the US dollar. It is a crypto-backed stablecoin: it exists only while a borrower holds a debt position. All of the reUSD DIA reads sits on Ethereum.
Sources: Resupply protocol site, overview of collateral and borrow rates, Resupply docs, Collateralized Debt Positions, Resupply docs, protocol Overview
46.9M reUSD in circulation, all on Ethereum. That is <0.1% of the USD stablecoin supply on the map, 43rd largest of 70.
All USD stablecoins, 30d: the change in DeFiLlama circulating supply summed over the 64 USD stablecoins with a reading at both ends of the window. Wrappers and rebasing stablecoins are left out. It is DeFiLlama’s figure, not a DIA read.
Source: DIA first-party onchain reads, the series the chart draws. Each figure is the change in the supply DIA reads across reUSD’s chains between two daily snapshots. Not mints minus redeems: DIA does not publish issuance flow.
Share and rank are against the combined supply of the 70 active USD stablecoins on the map, each valued at DIA’s own read and price where DIA holds one and at DeFiLlama’s circulating figure otherwise. Wrappers are left out, as in every total on the map.
46.9M reUSD
<0.1% of all USD stablecoin supply, #43 of 70
All supply on Ethereum
Supply growth
What the 10 largest addresses are
Shares of the 10 largest addresses' balance, contracts included, from public address labels covering 96.0% of it. Exchange custody is one address holding for many end holders. Unattributed addresses have no public label.
Counted on Ethereum. Excludes protocol and bridge contracts and issuer treasuries. Shares are of the supply on Ethereum less issuer treasuries and burn addresses. Protocol and bridge contracts stay in that supply but are not counted among the largest holders. The median column compares stablecoins counted on the same chain. A few of them are read from DIA’s replay state, which leaves contracts in, so a median can mix two rules.
Source: Blockscout.
471holders on Ethereum
34th of 43 USD stablecoins on Ethereum
| reUSD | Median, USD stablecoins on Ethereum | |
|---|---|---|
| Top holder | 3.0% | 16.5% |
| Top 10 | 4.4% | 53.3% |
| Top 50 | 4.4% | 57.0% |
| Top 100 | 4.4% | 74.7% |
Excludes protocol and bridge contracts and issuer treasuries. Shares are of the supply on Ethereum less issuer treasuries and burn addresses. Protocol and bridge contracts stay in that supply but are not counted among the largest holders.
reUSD's typical daily move over the last 90 days was 14 bps, steadier than 18 of 66 other USD stablecoins.
By default reUSD sits beside its largest USD peer by current supply. Add more from the picker below the chart. Figures are in basis points: 100 bps = 1%.
Peg volatility is how much reUSD's price swings around $1 from one day to the next: the standard deviation over 30 or 90 days. A stablecoin that sits steadily at $0.998 scores near zero. Largest deviation is the single day in the last 12 months furthest from $1, signed.
Median of peers, off by default, is the middle value among the peers currently shown; turn it on from the chart's controls.
The ranking counts every active USD stablecoin with at least two daily prices in the last 90 days.
Prices are daily closes at 00:00 UTC, from DeFiLlama with CoinGecko where DeFiLlama has no price. The chart beside this panel plots those same daily closes, so every figure in the table can be found on a line here. DeFiLlama quoted rounded and filled prices until 30 September 2025, so for USDT and USDC the closes before 1 October 2025 are the median of exchange closes instead, and a filled $1.0000 close is left out of the typical move and the largest move.
Stablecoins whose value rises by design, such as savings wrappers, are left out. Their price is a yield curve, not a peg.
Only USD stablecoins are compared. Other currencies are priced through a daily exchange rate fixed at a different time of day from the stablecoin's close. That gap shows up as the same false depeg on every stablecoin of the currency at once.
14 bps
Peg volatility, 90 days
typical day-to-day swing around $1
Over the last 90 days, reUSD's daily swings around $1 were smaller than those of 18 of 66 other USD stablecoins.
| Stablecoin | Today | 30d | 90d | Largest |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| −85 bps (−0.85%) | 13 bps | 14 bps | −192 bps (−1.92%) | |
| −13 bps (−0.13%) | 3.3 bps | 3.6 bps | −21 bps (−0.21%) |
The redemption floor
Redeemers choose a lending pool and take collateral out at $1 minus the redemption fee. That fee is 1%, split 0.95% to the borrower whose collateral is redeemed and 0.05% to the protocol. A January 2026 proposal moved the split from 0.8% and 0.2%, and rebuilt the interest rate model to raise borrow rates when reUSD trades under a dollar. If crvUSD or frxUSD trades above a dollar, the redemption fee rises in proportion.
Where the price sits
A February 2026 proposal set a permissionless redemption threshold at 0.985 and restricted redemptions above that price to an operator contract that forwards its profit to the treasury. The same proposal records value lost to external redemption bots of $30,954.21 in November 2025 and $16,060.83 in January 2026. The redemption handler contract has that guard enabled at 0.985, so anyone can redeem only while reUSD trades below that price.
Sources: Resupply docs, Stability Mechanics, Resupply governance forum, Redemption Fee and Interest Rate Adjustment, Resupply governance forum, Introduce a Redemption Guard to Reduce Value Leakage, Resupply docs, Savings reUSD, Blockscout, Resupply RedemptionHandler contract on Ethereum
Where reUSD is supplied in DeFi lending markets, what it earns there and the DEX pools it trades in.
Top 5 reUSD pools by TVL with a quoted APY.
TVL is what is deposited in the pool. For lending pools, that is before loans are taken out.
| APY | Composition | 30d avg | Quality | Protocol | Chain | Rewards | ▼TVL | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
6.88% | 6.88% | OrganicStable | +0.00% | $349.6M | Lending | |||
1.52% | 1.54% | OrganicStable | +0.00% | $29.1M | Savings | |||
12.10% | 12.06% | OrganicStable | +0.00% | $13.1M | Lending | |||
9.99% | 9.95% | OrganicStable | +0.29% | $13.1M | Lending | |||
3.35% | 7.45% | MixedVolatile | +1.97% | $10.2M | LP |
Source: DeFiLlama, DexScreener and on-chain balances, updated 1 Nov 2026.
reUSD in pool is reUSD's own side of the pool, at its USD price. Pool liquidity counts both sides.
$14.3M of reUSD sits in 4 DEX pools across 1 DEX.
| DEX | Pair | Chain | Pool liquidity | ▼reUSD in pool | 24h volume |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| scrvUSD / reUSD | $10.3M | $7.2M | $306.6K | ||
| sDOLA / reUSD | $5.9M | $3.8M | $231.4K | ||
| sfrxUSD / reUSD | $2.7M | $2.0M | $57.1K | ||
| reUSD / fxUSD | $1.9M | $1.4M | $29.2K |
reUSD is designed to be backed by other stablecoins.
What backs reUSD
Every reUSD is borrowed against an ERC-4626 supply receipt from a lending market. Resupply's risk framework limits collateral to ERC-4626 receipts from FraxLend and CurveLend with frxUSD or crvUSD as the underlying. Governance sets maximum LTV per lending position and a per-market borrow limit. The token contract is 0x57aB1E0003F623289CD798B1824Be09a793e4Bec on Ethereum, listed on the protocol's contract addresses page as "Stablecoin". The protocol's supply page shows total reUSD borrowed and total collateral across its lending markets.
What is not published
Resupply publishes no reserve attestation and no accountant's report. The audits page names two reports: yAudit dated 11 January 2025 and ChainSecurity dated 28 February 2025. The protocol's GitHub repository holds eight audit PDFs, including a ChainSecurity sreUSD review and an Electisec report titled Inflation Fixes. The audits page lists two of the eight.
Sources: Resupply docs, Collateralized Debt Positions, Resupply governance forum, Resupply Finance Risk Framework, Resupply docs, Contract Addresses, Resupply docs, Audits page, Resupply GitHub repository, audits directory listing, Resupply documentation index (llms.txt), Resupply app, Supply page with total reUSD borrowed and total collateral
0x57ab1e00…793e4becmint(address,uint256)Read from the deployed contract and its account on each chain. A control with no row is one the read could not settle, which is not the same as absent. “No” appears only where the verified contract source lists every function, or where the chain records that the control cannot exist, such as a package published as immutable.
Contract can mint
Its collateral sits in onchain positions that anyone can read, so there is no fiat reserve to attest.
Reserve attestation cadence
Collateral is held in onchain positions and can be read directly; there is no fiat reserve to attest.
Not applicable (no central issuer)recorded for the protocol; no central issuer
The June 2025 exploit
BlockSec dated the attack transaction to 26 June 2025. The attacker donated 2,000 crvUSD to a newly deployed market's controller and minted a single unit of vault shares, which pushed the exchange rate calculation, 1e36 divided by price, to round down to zero. The solvency check then passed on almost no collateral and 10,000,000 reUSD was borrowed.
Resupply's recovery plan, posted to its governance forum on 28 June 2025, put the bad debt at 10M reUSD. 2,868,832 reUSD had already been repaid by the Resupply treasury, the Convex treasury and C2tP. The plan burned 6,000,000 reUSD from a 38.7M insurance pool, about 15.5% of it, and left 1,131,168 reUSD of bad debt with the DAO to repay from future revenue. In August 2025 governance added a pair implementation enforcing collateral price threshold checks.
No external price oracle
Resupply prices reUSD as equal to frxUSD or crvUSD depending on the collateral. Its risk framework says this removes any dependency on third-party USD oracles, and accepts the added risk of those two coins' performance.
Insurance pool limits
The pool holds reUSD deposits and buys liquidated and bad-debt collateral. Bad debt beyond the pool is assumed by the protocol.
Sources: BlockSec, in-depth analysis of the Resupply protocol attack incident, Resupply governance forum, Resupply Recovery Plan, Resupply governance forum, Introduce Additional Protocol Security Guardrails, Resupply governance forum, Resupply Finance Risk Framework, Resupply docs, Insurance Pool
reUSD is borrowed against ERC-4626 supply receipts from lending markets. A user supplies crvUSD to Curve Lend or frxUSD to Fraxlend, deposits that position into a Resupply collateralized debt position, and mints reUSD against it. Resupply's risk framework limits collateral to ERC-4626 receipts from FraxLend and CurveLend with frxUSD or crvUSD as the underlying.
No. Resupply publishes no reserve attestation and no accountant's report. Its supply page shows total reUSD borrowed and total collateral across its lending markets. Its audits page names a yAudit report dated 11 January 2025 and a ChainSecurity report dated 28 February 2025, while the protocol's GitHub repository holds eight audit PDFs.
Through redemption. Redeemers take collateral out of a lending pool of their choice at one dollar minus a 1% redemption fee, which sets a floor. Since a February 2026 governance change, anyone can redeem only while reUSD trades below 0.985; above that price an operator contract handles redemptions. Borrow rates also rise when reUSD trades under a dollar.
BlockSec dated the attack transaction to 26 June 2025. The attacker donated 2,000 crvUSD to a newly deployed market's controller and minted a single unit of vault shares, forcing the exchange rate calculation to round to zero and letting 10,000,000 reUSD be borrowed against almost no collateral. Resupply's recovery plan burned 6,000,000 reUSD from its insurance pool.
The entire recorded supply sits on Ethereum, at contract 0x57aB1E0003F623289CD798B1824Be09a793e4Bec. Resupply's contract addresses page lists Ethereum addresses only.
Source: DIA onchain reads Updated
Source: DIA rebuild from onchain transfer history (to 11 Aug 2026), Block explorer holder counts (from 12 Aug 2026), Ethereum Updated
Daily close against the USD peg, in basis points. Drag the handles under the chart to zoom; a range button resets it. The axis spans -150 bps to +50 bps, set by the middle 98% of the closes in view, so one outlier does not flatten the rest. 4 closes sit beyond it, drawn on the edge with a triangle. The tooltip shows the true value.
The dotted vertical lines mark market stress events: days the whole market, or a stablecoin others hold as collateral, came under stress. Seeing every stablecoin on the same shock shows how each peg held. Only events with a published source are marked. Each entry under the chart shows every stablecoin's worst daily close within 3 days of the event.
Crypto sold off with global markets as Covid spread, ETH lost close to half its price, and a congested Ethereum let bidders win MakerDAO collateral auctions for zero DAI.
Bitcoin fell as much as 30% to about $30,000 after Chinese industry bodies warned banks off crypto, and more than $8 billion of positions were liquidated.
Terra's algorithmic stablecoin UST fell to about $0.65 as LUNA slid, the start of a run that wiped out both within days.
Tether's USDT fell to about 95 cents on some exchanges as UST collapsed, and recovered after Tether processed more than $3 billion of redemptions.
Crypto lender Celsius paused withdrawals citing extreme market conditions, as the discount of stETH to ETH reached a record 8%.
FTX halted customer withdrawals after about $6 billion left the exchange in 72 hours, and filed for bankruptcy days later.
Circle disclosed $3.3 billion of USDC reserves held at the failed Silicon Valley Bank, and USDC traded as low as $0.87 intraday, closed 11 March near $0.96 (the low a daily-close chart shows) and regained its peg on 13 March.
A reentrancy bug in old Vyper compiler versions let attackers drain over $70 million from Curve pools run by JPEG'd, Metronome and Alchemix.
A Bank of Japan rate rise set off an unwind of yen carry trades, and bitcoin fell to about $49,000 as crypto futures saw over $1 billion of liquidations.
North Korea's Lazarus Group took about $1.5 billion of ETH and stETH from Bybit's cold wallet, and the exchange saw over $4 billion of withdrawals.
Sweeping US tariffs on trading partners set off a global selloff, and bitcoin fell to about $74,500.
A 100% US tariff threat on Chinese imports set off the largest liquidation in crypto history, over $19 billion in a day, and USDe traded as low as $0.65 on Binance.
An attacker drained about $128 million from Balancer V2 pools on six chains through a rounding error in the pool maths.
Stream Finance disclosed a $93 million loss by an external fund manager and froze withdrawals, and its xUSD fell as low as $0.25.
Stables Labs' synthetic dollar USDX fell below $0.60 as redemptions ran ahead of its hedged positions, and lending markets that took it as collateral froze.
Bitcoin fell below $80,000 over a thin-liquidity weekend amid US and Iran tensions, liquidating about $2.5 billion of long positions in a day.
Bitcoin dropped more than 10% in a day to about $63,000, its worst one-day fall since the FTX collapse, as silver, software stocks and US indexes fell with it.
An attacker with a compromised minting key created about 80 million unbacked USR and sold them for roughly $25 million, and USR fell below $0.30.
A forged LayerZero message released 116,500 unbacked rsETH, about $292 million, and Aave, Spark and Fluid froze rsETH markets.
An attacker took over StablR's 1-of-3 minting multisig and minted about $13.5 million of unbacked USDR and EURR, and the issuer froze both coins.
Bitcoin slid below $62,000 on higher-for-longer rate bets and ETF outflows, and about $3 billion of leveraged positions were liquidated over two days.
Source: DeFiLlama and CoinGecko prices Updated