Verify what backs a stablecoin
DIA Value computes intrinsic fair value for stablecoins from reserves and on-chain data, so backing and peg health can be verified.
Supply
Peg today
above 1 CHF
Chains
Holders on Ethereum
Share of supply in lending
at least
Best yield
ranked by lower of 30d and spot APY × deposits · Frankencoin · 3.50% base, 0% rewards
ZCHF is a CHF stablecoin minted by the Frankencoin protocol's smart contracts, with no central issuer, launched in Apr 2023.
Frankencoin (ZCHF) is a decentralised Swiss franc stablecoin that runs on Ethereum mainnet and is available across several other chains. It has no issuer. It is created by smart contracts when users lock collateral, not by a bank, e-money institution or any other company. Tokens deposited onchain as collateral back the ZCHF in circulation.
The protocol is permissionless and self-governing. Holders of the Frankencoin Share Token (FCS), which wraps the underlying FPS equity token, can veto new collateral types and new minting modules, and set protocol rates such as the savings rate.
Frankencoin describes its design as oracle-free. Where most lending protocols depend on an external price feed, this protocol prices collateral through a market auction mechanism, a design the project traces to a PhD thesis at the University of Zurich.
Sources: Frankencoin: What is Frankencoin, Frankencoin documentation: Overview, Frankencoin documentation, governance, Frankencoin compliance page, Frankencoin token page
35.0M ZCHF in circulation across 8 chains; Ethereum carries 87.5%.
Source: DIA first-party onchain reads, the series the chart draws. Each figure is the change in the supply DIA reads across ZCHF’s chains between two daily snapshots. Not mints minus redeems: DIA does not publish issuance flow.
35.0M ZCHF (US$42.5M)
Ethereum 87.5% · other chains 12.5%
Ethereum30.6M ZCHF · 87.5%
Base1.8M ZCHF · 5.0%
Gnosis1.5M ZCHF · 4.3%
Optimism1.1M ZCHF · 3.1%
Arbitrum15.1K ZCHF · <0.1%
Polygon1.1K ZCHF · <0.1%
Avalanche17 ZCHF · <0.1%
Sonic2 ZCHF · <0.1%Supply growth
What the 10 largest addresses are
Shares of the 10 largest addresses' balance, contracts included, from public address labels covering 81.0% of it. Exchange custody is one address holding for many end holders. Unattributed addresses have no public label.
Counted on Ethereum. Excludes protocol and bridge contracts and issuer treasuries. Shares are of the supply on Ethereum less issuer treasuries and burn addresses. Protocol and bridge contracts stay in that supply but are not counted among the largest holders.
Source: Blockscout.
2,219holders on Ethereum
| ZCHF | |
|---|---|
| Top holder | 6.5% |
| Top 10 | 18.4% |
| Top 50 | 22.6% |
| Top 100 | 24.0% |
Excludes protocol and bridge contracts and issuer treasuries. Shares are of the supply on Ethereum less issuer treasuries and burn addresses. Protocol and bridge contracts stay in that supply but are not counted among the largest holders.
How far ZCHF trades from its CHF peg, from DIA's daily price reads.
Figures are in basis points: 100 bps = 1%.
Peg volatility is how much ZCHF's price swings around 1 CHF from one day to the next: the standard deviation over 30 or 90 days. A stablecoin that sits steadily at 0.998 CHF scores near zero. Largest deviation is the single day in the last 12 months furthest from 1 CHF, signed.
The ranking counts every active CHF stablecoin with at least two daily prices in the last 90 days.
Prices are daily closes at 00:00 UTC, from DeFiLlama with CoinGecko where DeFiLlama has no price. The chart beside this panel plots those same daily closes, so every figure in the table can be found on a line here. DeFiLlama quoted rounded and filled prices until 30 September 2025, so for USDT and USDC the closes before 1 October 2025 are the median of exchange closes instead, and a filled US$1.0000 close is left out of the typical move and the largest move.
Stablecoins whose value rises by design, such as savings wrappers, are left out. Their price is a yield curve, not a peg.
Only USD stablecoins are compared. Other currencies are priced through a daily exchange rate fixed at a different time of day from the stablecoin's close. That gap shows up as the same false depeg on every stablecoin of the currency at once.
For a CHF stablecoin, the largest deviation leaves out days when most other CHF stablecoins closed the same distance from par on the same side: that move is the exchange rate, not ZCHF. A move ZCHF makes alone, or a discount it holds while the others stay at par, is kept.
21 bps
Peg volatility, 90 days
typical day-to-day swing around 1 CHF
Leaves out 34 days when most other CHF stablecoins moved the same way. The CHF exchange rate is taken at a different time from the close, so a move shared by the whole currency is timing, not a depeg. The chart still shows those days.
| Stablecoin | Today | 30d | 90d | Largest |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 ZCHF | +9 bps (+0.09%) | 20 bps | 21 bps | +114 bps (+1.14%) |
There is no hard peg to the Swiss franc. Frankencoin's documentation states that a set of economic constraints incentivises the market to push the price softly toward parity from both sides, rather than a fixed redemption promise against a central bank.
Holders of the governance token, FCS, influence the long-term price by making it more or less expensive to mint ZCHF, in the way a central bank manages its own currency. The underlying assumption is that these holders keep ZCHF near parity because their own tokens are worth most when the stablecoin tracks the franc reliably.
Because the protocol does not use a price oracle, collateral valuation runs through auctions. Anyone can challenge a position if they believe its liquidation price is below the true value of the collateral, triggering an auction that determines the market price. Liquidations play out over days rather than the minutes an oracle-based system might take.
Sources: Frankencoin documentation: Overview, Frankencoin documentation: Collateralized minting, Frankencoin documentation, governance
US$9.0K of ZCHF is supplied to 2 lending markets on 1 protocol, <0.1% of its onchain supply.
At least this much ZCHF is supplied to lending markets DIA reads onchain, where it can be borrowed. The figure is gross: most of it is on loan, and a borrower can deposit borrowed ZCHF again, so the same money can count more than once. Coins posted only as isolated collateral (Morpho-style) are not counted. Excludes DEX liquidity, CDP collateral, and chains or protocols DIA does not yet track.
Source: DIA's own reads of each lending contract. Balances, supply and borrow rates and utilisation all come from the same read. A market not refreshed in the last 3 days, holding under US$1,000 of ZCHF, or pinned at full utilisation with runaway interest is left out.
Token balances are converted to USD at DIA's own price for ZCHF.
Both figures are averages across markets, weighted by how much ZCHF each market holds. A US$1B market counts a thousand times more than a US$1M one. Markets holding 100% of the balance report an APY.
US$9K<0.1% of supply
supplied to 2 lending markets on 1 protocol
58%
Borrowed
share of supplied ZCHF now on loan
3.16%
Average supply APY
weighted by ZCHF balance in each market
By protocol
100%US$9KEthereumZCHF / xCVXUS$6K0.76%65%EthereumZCHF / WBTCUS$3K8.81%42%ZCHF in lending markets, by chain, largest first. The bar is each chain's share of ZCHF's lending balance.
Ethereumin 2 lending markets100%US$9KTop 5 ZCHF pools by TVL with a quoted APY.
TVL is what is deposited in the pool. For lending pools, that is before loans are taken out.
| APY | Composition | 30d avg | Quality | Protocol | Chain | Rewards | ▼TVL | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
3.50% | 3.50% | OrganicStable | Ethereum | +0.00% | US$12.6M | Lending | ||
0.04% | 0.36% | LP fees · IL riskVolatile | Ethereum | +0.00% | US$2.4M | LP | ||
0.21% | 0.75% | LP fees · IL riskVolatile |  OP Mainnet | +0.00% | US$1.5M | LP | ||
3.50% | 3.50% | OrganicStable | Gnosis | +0.00% | US$1.5M | Lending | ||
3.25% | 5.29% | IncentiveStable | Ethereum | +3.23% | US$736.6K | LP |
Source: DeFiLlama, DexScreener and on-chain balances, updated 1 Nov 2026.
ZCHF in pool is ZCHF's own side of the pool, at its USD price. Pool liquidity counts both sides.
US$3.1M of ZCHF sits in 6 DEX pools across 3 DEXs.
| DEX | Pair | Chain | Pool liquidity | ▼ZCHF in pool | 24h volume |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ZCHF / USDT | Ethereum | US$2.4M | US$1.2M | US$89.7K | |
| ZCHF / USDC | Base | US$1.5M | US$796.2K | US$6.3K | |
| ZCHF / USDC | Optimism | US$1.6M | US$482.3K | US$2.3K | |
| ZCHF / crvUSD | Ethereum | US$738.0K | US$374.3K | US$55.9K | |
| ZCHF / USDC | Optimism | US$280.8K | US$176.9K | US$2.0K | |
| ZCHF / WETH | Ethereum | US$180.0K | US$87.2K | US$1.4K |
The Frankencoin site highlights payments in Swiss francs, store of wealth and borrowing against collateral. It points to the franc's record of relative stability, noting that the Swiss franc has appreciated more than 240% against the US dollar over the past 50 years, and positions onchain CHF exposure for Swiss users and businesses.
ZCHF can be bought through on-ramp services such as Mt Pelerin and DFX, swapped on decentralised exchanges such as Curve, Uniswap and CowSwap, and supplied as liquidity on Curve.
The token runs on Ethereum mainnet and is bridged to Polygon, Arbitrum, Optimism, Base, Avalanche, Gnosis and Sonic, with a matching contract address across the non-Ethereum deployments.
Sources: Frankencoin: Use cases, Frankencoin: What is Frankencoin, Frankencoin FAQ, Frankencoin documentation: Overview, Frankencoin token page
ZCHF is designed to be backed by crypto held as overcollateral.
ZCHF is over-collateralised. Anyone can mint ZCHF by depositing approved collateral into a position, and the collateral must exceed the value of the minted ZCHF, creating a buffer against price moves. The rule applies per position: each position's collateral secures only the ZCHF minted from it.
A separate reserve, made up of minter reserves and the equity of holders of FCS and FPS, provides an additional layer of protection. On 2 October 2026 it held CHF 11.6 million, of which CHF 8.0 million was minter reserves and CHF 3.6 million equity. The documentation describes equity holders as carrying the residual risk of liquidations, similar to bank shareholders, and as earning fees and liquidation profits in return.
There is no custody bank and no fiat reserve account to attest. All collateral, positions and system parameters are publicly verifiable on the blockchain. Frankencoin's monitoring dashboard shows the system health ratios and a collateral overview. On 2 October 2026 its data feed put collateral at 159% of total supply and 240% of free-float supply, which excludes equity and minter reserves.
Sources: Frankencoin: What is Frankencoin, Frankencoin documentation: Overview, Frankencoin documentation, risks, Frankencoin MCP server, protocol snapshot, Frankencoin monitoring, system health, Frankencoin monitoring, collateral overview, Frankencoin API, collateral ratio history
Ethereum0xd4dd9e2f…c5d45553mint(address,uint256)0xd4dd9e2f…c5d45553mint(address,uint256)0xd4dd9e2f…c5d45553mint(address,uint256)0xb58e61c3…d80921cbmint(address,uint256)0xd4dd9e2f…c5d45553mint(address,uint256)0xd4dd9e2f…c5d45553mint(address,uint256)0xd4dd9e2f…c5d45553mint(address,uint256)0xd4dd9e2f…c5d45553mint(address,uint256)Read from the deployed contract and its account on each chain. A control with no row is one the read could not settle, which is not the same as absent. “No” appears only where the verified contract source lists every function, or where the chain records that the control cannot exist, such as a package published as immutable.
Contract can mint
Its collateral sits in onchain positions that anyone can read, so there is no fiat reserve to attest.
ZCHF has no issuer, so there is no issuer to examine for compliance. The Frankencoin Association, a Swiss non-profit in Zug, is a point of contact and supports the ecosystem. It does not control the protocol. The protocol is governed by the veto rights of FCS holders.
Governance is veto-based. Anyone can propose a new collateral type or a new method of bringing ZCHF into circulation, and holders with more than 1% of voting power can veto such a proposal. The documentation describes the system as operating without intermediaries, central operators or trusted third parties.
Because there is no issuer, there is no banking licence, no e-money regime and no reserve attestation to review. A legal assessment cited by the project classifies ZCHF as a payment token under FINMA guidelines, and its MiCA legal opinion says issuer duties do not apply because there is no identifiable issuer. A MiCA white paper for ZCHF, prepared by the MiCA Crypto Alliance and registered by MiCA Crypto Alliance Opco Limited, is listed in ESMA's interim register. The relevant transparency surface is onchain: positions, collateral and liquidations are all on the public record.
Sources: Frankencoin documentation: Overview, Frankencoin: What is Frankencoin, Frankencoin FAQ, Frankencoin documentation, governance, Frankencoin compliance page, ESMA interim MiCA register, crypto-assets other than ARTs and EMTs (OTHER.csv), LEXR Germany, ZCHF MiCA legal assessment, public summary (9 February 2026), MiCA Crypto Alliance, ZCHF MiCA White Paper (iXBRL)
Reserve attestation cadence
Collateral is held in onchain positions and can be read directly; there is no fiat reserve to attest.
Not applicable (no central issuer)recorded for the protocol; no central issuer
ZCHF's value rests on the collateral posted into its positions. If collateral prices fall, positions approach their liquidation price and the automated liquidation mechanism activates. Because pricing is auction-based rather than feed-driven, the process is slower than an oracle-based system, a trade-off the documentation acknowledges.
The peg is soft, so ZCHF can trade away from one franc, and no central party is obligated to redeem it at par against fiat. The documentation describes the system as relying on economic incentives and on holders of FCS and FPS acting in the system's interest.
There is no fiat reserve and no auditor attestation of a bank balance, because the backing is onchain collateral rather than bank deposits. A reader checking ZCHF's backing reads the protocol's positions and monitoring dashboard rather than a reserve report. The documentation notes that aggregate collateral above total supply does not rule out a shortfall, because each position's collateral secures only that position.
Sources: Frankencoin documentation: Overview, Frankencoin: What is Frankencoin, Frankencoin documentation, risks, Frankencoin monitoring, system health
Nobody. ZCHF has no issuer. It is created by smart contracts when users lock approved collateral, and holders of the Frankencoin Share Token (FCS) can veto changes. The Frankencoin Association, a Swiss non-profit, is a point of contact and supports the ecosystem but does not control the protocol.
Over-collateralised positions. Users deposit approved collateral, mostly bitcoin and ether tokens, and each position's collateral must be worth more than the ZCHF minted against it. On 2 October 2026 collateral stood at 159% of total supply. Minter reserves and the equity of holders of FCS and FPS add a further buffer.
Instead of reading an external price feed, the protocol prices collateral through auctions. Anyone can challenge a position if they believe its collateral is undervalued, which triggers an auction that determines market price. There is no hard peg, and the price is pushed toward parity by economic incentives.
12 days are left blank: chain coverage changed or a contract read failed, so those totals are not comparable.
Source: DIA onchain reads Updated
Source: DIA rebuild from onchain transfer history (to 11 Aug 2026), Block explorer holder counts (from 12 Aug 2026), Ethereum Updated
Daily close against the CHF peg, in basis points. Drag the handles under the chart to zoom; a range button resets it. The axis spans -150 bps to +150 bps, set by the middle 98% of the closes in view, so one outlier does not flatten the rest. 2 closes sit beyond it, drawn on the edge with a triangle. The tooltip shows the true value.
The dotted vertical lines mark market stress events: days the whole market, or a stablecoin others hold as collateral, came under stress. Seeing every stablecoin on the same shock shows how each peg held. Only events with a published source are marked. Each entry under the chart shows every stablecoin's worst daily close within 3 days of the event.
Crypto sold off with global markets as Covid spread, ETH lost close to half its price, and a congested Ethereum let bidders win MakerDAO collateral auctions for zero DAI.
Bitcoin fell as much as 30% to about $30,000 after Chinese industry bodies warned banks off crypto, and more than $8 billion of positions were liquidated.
Terra's algorithmic stablecoin UST fell to about $0.65 as LUNA slid, the start of a run that wiped out both within days.
Tether's USDT fell to about 95 cents on some exchanges as UST collapsed, and recovered after Tether processed more than $3 billion of redemptions.
Crypto lender Celsius paused withdrawals citing extreme market conditions, as the discount of stETH to ETH reached a record 8%.
FTX halted customer withdrawals after about $6 billion left the exchange in 72 hours, and filed for bankruptcy days later.
Circle disclosed $3.3 billion of USDC reserves held at the failed Silicon Valley Bank, and USDC traded as low as $0.87 intraday, closed 11 March near $0.96 (the low a daily-close chart shows) and regained its peg on 13 March.
A reentrancy bug in old Vyper compiler versions let attackers drain over $70 million from Curve pools run by JPEG'd, Metronome and Alchemix.
A Bank of Japan rate rise set off an unwind of yen carry trades, and bitcoin fell to about $49,000 as crypto futures saw over $1 billion of liquidations.
North Korea's Lazarus Group took about $1.5 billion of ETH and stETH from Bybit's cold wallet, and the exchange saw over $4 billion of withdrawals.
Sweeping US tariffs on trading partners set off a global selloff, and bitcoin fell to about $74,500.
A 100% US tariff threat on Chinese imports set off the largest liquidation in crypto history, over $19 billion in a day, and USDe traded as low as $0.65 on Binance.
An attacker drained about $128 million from Balancer V2 pools on six chains through a rounding error in the pool maths.
Stream Finance disclosed a $93 million loss by an external fund manager and froze withdrawals, and its xUSD fell as low as $0.25.
Stables Labs' synthetic dollar USDX fell below $0.60 as redemptions ran ahead of its hedged positions, and lending markets that took it as collateral froze.
Bitcoin fell below $80,000 over a thin-liquidity weekend amid US and Iran tensions, liquidating about $2.5 billion of long positions in a day.
Bitcoin dropped more than 10% in a day to about $63,000, its worst one-day fall since the FTX collapse, as silver, software stocks and US indexes fell with it.
An attacker with a compromised minting key created about 80 million unbacked USR and sold them for roughly $25 million, and USR fell below $0.30.
A forged LayerZero message released 116,500 unbacked rsETH, about $292 million, and Aave, Spark and Fluid froze rsETH markets.
An attacker took over StablR's 1-of-3 minting multisig and minted about $13.5 million of unbacked USDR and EURR, and the issuer froze both coins.
Bitcoin slid below $62,000 on higher-for-longer rate bets and ETF outflows, and about $3 billion of leveraged positions were liquidated over two days.
ZCHFSource: DeFiLlama and CoinGecko prices Updated