USDC traded as low as $0.86 for roughly 60 hours in March 2023. The trigger was Circle’s disclosure of $3.3 billion of reserves stuck at Silicon Valley Bank after the bank entered receivership. Reserve composition by counterparty had not been publicly disclosed before the run. By the time it was, the secondary market had already moved. Monthly attestation had been performed on schedule. It did not prevent the depeg.

The FDUSD scare in April 2025 followed the same pattern. A single social media post questioning the issuer’s solvency moved the price 13 percent in hours. The defense was an attestation 32 days old. Reserves turned out to be intact. The protocol-side cost of the data gap was already realized.

The FTX-Alameda collapse the year before sits in a different category. Customer collateral was systematically commingled with Alameda’s trading positions. No periodic attestation in the prior 12 months had caught it. The shortfall, roughly 8 billion dollars when bankruptcy was filed, was structurally invisible to any snapshot review. Wrapped asset infinite-mint exploits have a similar shape: reserves and supply never reconciled in real time, drained when the gap was exploited.